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Essays on Unemployment Policies
Ofer Setty
Chapter 1: Optimal Unemployment Insurance
with Monitoring
Public spending on labor market policies was on average 1.6 percent of output in industrialized countries in 2001
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
2005). These labor market policies can be divided into passive and active policies. Passive policies, such as constant
benefits to the unemployed, are mainly concerned with
the welfare of the unemployed worker, while active policies, such as job-search monitoring and training, are mainly
concerned with increasing the unemployment exit rate. In the
last three decades, active labor market policies have gained a
higher share of the total spending on labor policies and have
received increased attention as governments seek to insure
unemployed workers without damaging their incentives for
becoming employed.
Given that additional policy instruments such as jobsearch monitoring are available and are implemented by
governments, it is important to model these instruments,
to examine the extent to which these instruments increase
the efficiency of unemployment insurance programs, and
to compare existing policies to the optimal policy. This is a
nontrivial task since such instruments, as valuable as they
may be, are also costly.
In practice, monitoring requires the unemployed worker
to record his job-search activities, typically by listing the
employers he contacted in a given period. At the employment
office, a caseworker evaluates occasionally whether the jobsearch requirements are met, for example, by verifying that
the contacts are authentic. If the caseworker finds the report
unsatisfactory, then she may impose sanctions, usually in the
form of benefits reduction for a limited period.
The objective of this chapter is to model monitoring in the
framework of optimal unemployment insurance developed
by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), and to characterize the
optimal allocation in the presence of monitoring. In Hopenhayn and Nicolini, a risk-neutral planner—the government—insures a risk-averse worker against unemployment
by setting transfers during unemployment and a wage tax or
a subsidy during employment. During unemployment, the
worker searches for a job by exerting an effort level that is
his private information. The first best, had the planner been
able to observe the information, is to deliver to the worker
constant benefits regardless of the employment status. However, since the planner cannot observe the job-search effort
level, constant benefits would flaw the worker’s incentives to
search for a job. Therefore, to solve the incentive-insurance
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trade-off, benefits during unemployment should continuously decrease and the wage tax upon reemployment should
continuously increase.
I incorporate monitoring into the optimal unemployment
insurance framework as follows. The planner monitors the
unemployed worker with some history-dependent probability. When a worker is monitored, the planner pays a cost and
receives a signal that is correlated with the job-search effort
of the worker. The planner uses that signal to improve the
efficiency of the contract by conditioning future payments
and the wage tax, not only on the employment outcome, but
also on the signal. These future values create endogenous
sanctions and rewards that, together with the random monitoring, create effective job-search incentives: the worker
exerts a high job-search effort level in order to increase the
probability of a good signal, and consequently to increase the
probability of higher payments.
I find that at the constrained optimum, the planner chooses
for each type of unemployed worker a specific combination
of monitoring frequency and sanction severity: as the generosity of the welfare system increases, the planner monitors
the unemployed more frequently but imposes lower sanctions. This policy pattern is linked to the worker’s risk aversion. As the generosity of the welfare system increases, the
planner finds it more costly to sanction the worker because
the reward that is required to counterbalance a given sanction
increases with the level of promised utility. At the same time,
the cost of acquiring the monitoring signal is fixed in units of
consumption, and therefore the planner shifts gradually from
applying severe sanctions at a low probability to applying
less severe sanctions at a higher probability.
The second objective of the chapter is to estimate the
value of the additional instrument of monitoring by comparing the results of the model to the results of a model where
monitoring technology is unavailable. I find that when comparing the two models at a balanced budget (zero net cost for
the planner), monitoring decreases the variance of consumption by about two-thirds and eliminates roughly half of the
government’s cost of the model without monitoring.
The third objective is to contrast the actual monitoring
policy in the United States with the optimal scheme and assess the gain from shifting to the optimal scheme.
Figure 1 shows the levels of consumption for both the optimal and actual policies for a worker who starts unemployed
and goes through the following five states: 1) nonmonitored
unemployment, 2) monitored unemployment with a good
signal, 3) nonmonitored unemployment, 4) monitored unemployment with a bad signal, and 5) employment, denoted as
the sequence {n,g,n,b,e}. The top panel shows both policies
on the same wide vertical scale. The bottom panel shows the
optimal policy on a tighter vertical scale in order to emphasize those variations in consumption that cannot be visualized in the top panel. The sharp changes in consumption in
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Figure 1 Simulated Consumption of the Optimal and
Actual Monitoring Policies in the United States
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the actual policy, where the planner conditions only on the
current state, are replaced by quite moderate changes in the
optimal policy, where the planner conditions consumption on
the complete history of the agent. Specifically, the one-time
decrease of 23 percent in the monthly benefit in the actual
policy is replaced by a persistent decrease of only 5 percent
in the optimal policy.
In order to estimate quantitatively the budget savings of
moving from the actual policy to the optimal policy, I simulate both policies as follows. First, I simulate 5,000 workers
across T = 60 months according to actual U.S. policy to find
the average cost for the planner and the expected utility delivered to the worker for the T periods. Then, I fix an initial
level of promised utility in the optimal policy to match the
same level of expected utility as in the actual policy. Finally,
I simulate the optimal scheme and find its cost. The difference between the two costs is the gain for the planner from
applying the optimal policy in the United States. Shifting to
the optimal monitoring policy would save $521 per unemployed worker per unemployment spell. These savings can
be translated into an increase of 1.8 percent in consumption
over time T.

Chapter 2: Optimal Welfare Programs with
Search, Work, and Training
(with Nicola Pavoni and Gianluca Violante)
This chapter extends the recent literature on government
expenditure programs that combine different policies, called
Welfare-to-Work (WTW) programs. In these programs,
governments utilize the large variety of policy instruments
targeting the unemployed, such as job-search aid, training,
and unemployment insurance. Interestingly, governments
use a mix of policy instruments for workers with different
characteristics.
This chapter has three goals. First, we enlarge the set of
instruments in the WTW literature that is available for the
government toward unemployed workers. This variety of instruments is inspired by a unique dataset called the National
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Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies (NEWWS). This
is a large-scale longitudinal study conducted by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services between 1991
and 1999. As part of the survey, 40,000 individuals in seven
distinct U.S. locations were randomly assigned to various
treatment-control groups. Two key programs or approaches
were studied in this large-scale experiment.
In the first approach, the labor force attachment (LFA) approach, individuals were encouraged to gain quick entry into
the labor market, even at low wages. In the second approach,
called the human capital development (HCD) approach,
individuals were directed to avail themselves of education
services, and to a lesser extent, occupational training before
they sought work, under the theory that they would then be
able to get better jobs.
To accommodate these two approaches we introduce
into the model four technologies. The first two are associated with both LFA and HCD approaches: search, where the
worker is looking for a job on her own, and matching, where
a caseworker assists the worker by creating an interview (a
match) for the worker. The third technology, which is associated with the LFA approach, is secondary production, where
the worker is producing a low output. The fourth technology,
associated with the HCD approach, is training, targeted at
increasing the human capital of the worker.
Three policies are included in both the LFA and the HCD
sets of policies. The first is Unemployment Insurance (UI),
where the planner assigns the worker to the search technology with high effort. The second is job-search aid (JA), where
the planner uses the matching technology and the effort recommendation is low. The third policy that is joint to both sets
of policies is social assistance (SA), where there is no use of
technologies and the effort recommendation is low.
In the LFA set there are, in addition to these three policies,
two unique policies that use secondary production technology. The first is mandatory work (MW), where the effort
recommendation is high. The second unique policy to LFA is
transitory work (TW), where the planner uses, in addition to
the secondary production technology, the matching technology, and the effort recommendation is high.
The HCD set of policies includes two unique policies as
well. These policies use the training technology. The first is
formal training (FT), where the effort recommendation is
high. The second unique policy to HCD is on-the-job training (OJT), where the planner uses, combined with the assignment to training, the matching technology, and the effort
recommendation is high
Our analysis is different from the standard study of such
technologies. First, one key input of the analysis is the
technologies parameters, which are neglected in the standard
one. Second, thanks to the structural framework, we take into
account the direct costs and returns as well as the standard
opportunity cost present in the standard analysis. We also
take into account additional return (due to policy comple-
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mentarity) and costs (due to policy crowding out) associated
with the existence of the other policies.
In the model workers differ in the level of their human
capital and their labor histories. Based on this heterogeneity, the second goal of the chapter is to identify which policy
is appropriate for each type of worker and to describe the
economic forces behind such choices. This is especially important given the rich set of policies that can be assigned to
unemployed workers. To answer such questions, we characterize the optimal sequence of policies and the optimal level
and time-path of consumption, i.e., benefits during unemployment, and taxes or subsidies upon reemployment.
Following Pavoni and Violante (2007), we characterize
the optimal policy on a (U,h) state space. However, in order
to conclude on the time-varying policies, we use in the state
space the unemployment duration, d, (recall that there is a
one-to-one mapping between the two states). Figure 2 shows
the optimal policy within the LFA set on the (U,h) state space.
For low levels of U the planner assigns the worker first
to UI because the effort cost is relatively low and the human
capital level that determines the success of UI is relatively
high. As human capital depreciates (still for low levels of
promised utility) the job-search probability decreases and the
planner shifts from UI to TW where both the employment
probability and the secondary production are independent of
the human capital level. Finally, as human capital further depreciates, the return to matching decreases because employment’s production depends on human capital and the planner
gives up on the matching activity, leading the planner to
choose MW.
Figure 2 Optimal Policies on the (U,h) State Space—LFA

For higher levels of promised utility the planner shifts
from UI to policies that do not require the worker’s effort
since the effort compensation cost is to too high. Note that
the shift from UI to JA at high levels of U can happen even
when π(h)≠λ. This is the case because either the effort cost at
high levels of U is too high (π(h)<λ) or the matching cost is
too high (π(h)>λ).
Figure 3 shows the optimal policy within the HCD set
on the (U,h) state space. The transitions between UI, JA,
and SA are the same as above. When moving horizontally
(along h) at low levels of U, the planner shifts from UI to OT
because as h depreciates, the return for OT increases because
the human capital upgrade increases. Matching is used only
at intermediary levels of h because its return as leading to
employment decreases with the decrease of human capital.
The third goal of the chapter is of a normative nature. We
evaluate existing U.S. programs by comparing them to the
efficient program. We calibrate the labor market parameters
and the various technology parameters by using the NEWWS
dataset’s treatment-control groups to perform a standard assessment of the effectiveness of each technology. We assess
whether each training policy is effective enough to be adopted within an optimal WTW program, and assess whether its
timing is consistent with the timing in the efficient program.

Chapter 3: Unemployment Accounts
Unemployment accounts (UAs) are mandatory individual
saving accounts that can be used by governments as an alternative to the UI system. The goal of this chapter is to study
the welfare implications of a shift from the current UI system
to a new UA system in the United States. The importance of
Figure 3 Optimal Policies on the (U,h) State Space—HCD

2010 Dissertation Summaries

15

such a study is reflected even in the precrisis 2007 statistics:
state UI programs paid $32 billion in unemployment benefits
to 7.6 million unemployed workers (U.S. Department of
Labor 2008). As noted by Feldstein (2005), these policies are
particularly important because of their impact on macroeconomic performance. Using a calibrated structural model, I
provide a quantitative analysis of both the average and the
distributional welfare effects of a shift from UI to UA.
UA work as follows. During employment, the worker is
mandated to save a fraction of her labor income in an individual saving account. The worker is entitled to withdraw
payments as a fraction of her last earnings (a “replacement
rate”) from this account only during unemployment. At
retirement the residual balance is transferred to the worker.
A system of UA was implemented in Chile in 2002, and it is
debated whether such a system should be implemented in the
United States and in other countries, e.g., Feldstein (2005),
Orszag and Snower (2002), and Sehnbruch (2004).
Figure 4 shows a graphic representation of the UA system
for a worker who starts off employed, becomes unemployed,
and remains unemployed indefinitely. The bottom panel of
the figure shows the balance of the unemployment account.
The balance is zero at the starting point, increases gradually during employment and then declines gradually during
unemployment. Once the balance is exhausted the account
remains at its lower bound of 0. The top panel of Figure
4 shows the withdrawals and transfers associated with the
unemployment system for that worker. During employment
the worker pays her mandated contribution to the unemployment account. Upon unemployment, the worker withdraws
payments from the account at a prespecified rate until the
account is exhausted. From that point onward the worker
receives SA benefits.
In contrast to the UA system, UI is funded by a payroll
tax, and benefits are a replacement rate for a limited duration.
Figure 5 shows a graphic representation of the UI system for
the same worker examined above. During employment, the
worker pays an unemployment tax. Upon unemployment, the
worker receives benefits proportional to her last earnings, for
the duration of UI benefits. Once the time limit of benefits is
reached, the worker receives SA benefits. Note that while the
maximum duration of benefits in UI is fixed, the duration of
withdrawals in UA depends on the balance of the unemployment account at the beginning of the unemployment spell.
This duration can be longer or shorter than the time limit of
UI benefits. In other words, in UA it is the fixed replacement
rate and the initial balance, rather than a fixed time limit, that
determine the duration of payments.
Thus, the main difference between the two systems is
the source of funding payments during unemployment: in
UI payments are funded by a common fund, whereas in UA
payments are funded by the worker’s own resources. At the
same time, the two systems share two common principles:

Figure 4 The UA System
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unemployment payments are provided for a limited duration,
and payments are indexed to past earnings.
In order to study the welfare effects of a shift from UI to
UA, I build a heterogeneous agents, incomplete-markets,
life-cycle model, in which workers face income fluctuations
and unemployment shocks. Workers in the model differ
along several key dimensions, including age, unemployment risk, income, and wealth. Unemployment in the model
is driven both by exogenous factors (layoffs for employed
workers and search frictions for unemployed workers) and
endogenous decisions (job quits for employed workers and
job-offer rejections for unemployed workers).
The government can implement either a UI or a UA
system. The UI policy is modeled as a choice of a replacement rate, and a time limit of unemployment benefits. The
UA policy is modeled as a choice of a deposit rate into the
account during employment and a withdrawal rate during
unemployment. Workers who exhaust their unemployment
payments in either policy regime (they reached the time
limit in UI and they have a zero balance in UA) receive SA
indefinitely.
Given the unemployment policy, workers allocate their
resources optimally between consumption and savings. In
Figure 5 The UI System
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addition, workers with employment opportunities choose
between employment and unemployment. The government
takes into account these endogenous decisions when designing the parameters of the unemployment system in order to
maximize the welfare of the workers.
Under the UI system, labor supply decisions are distorted
by the presence of unemployment benefits, which increases
the value of being unemployed, and by the payroll tax
required to finance unemployment benefits, which decreases
the value of being employed. The main advantage of UA is
that it alleviates this incentive problem.
On the other hand, the insurance provided by the UA
policy may not be enough for two types of workers. The
first is young workers who start off with no mandatory savings. Upon unemployment, these workers would exhaust
their mandatory account quickly and will only receive SA
benefits. The second type of workers who are under insured
in the UA regime is workers with consecutive unemployment
spells. Such workers might not be able to replenish the mandatory account during the employment interval between the
unemployment spell. Thus, they will find themselves with
no unemployment payments in the upcoming unemployment spells. In contrast, such workers in UI would be equally
insured for each unemployment spell. The underinsurance of
these two groups of workers is especially important for poor
workers who have limited ability to smooth their consumption during unemployment.
These two opposite effects of UA, the improved incentives and the reduced insurance, imply that the question of
whether unemployment is “voluntary” is closely linked to
the welfare implications of a shift from UI to UA. If workers
choose to be unemployed, then UA can improve average ex
ante welfare by increasing the employment level and decreasing the labor tax. If, however, workers are involuntarily
unemployed due to exogenous frictions, such as the absence
of job offers, then the UI system is preferred and the shift to
the UA leads to a welfare loss, which is especially high for
workers who enter the labor force with little wealth.
This observation puts the chapter at the nexus of the debate on the level of disutility from work. This value is central
in the determination of whether unemployment is mostly
involuntary as assumed, for example, by Kitao, Ljungqvist,
and Sargent (2008) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008), or
mostly voluntary as assumed, for example, by Rogerson and
Wallenius (2007) and Prescott, Rogerson, and Wallenius
(2009).
I contribute to these debates by connecting my model with
the extensive literature that studies the effect of variations in
the UI policy on some observable moments. By matching the
elasticity of average unemployment duration with respect to
changes in UI benefits, I provide a convincing point estimate
for disutility from work.
Using this estimate I show that the shift from UI to UA
leads to an average ex ante welfare gain of 0.9 percent
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of lifetime consumption. This shift makes workers in all
quintiles of initial assets better off. Young workers, however,
are worse off because they have low balances of mandatory
accounts.
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